Plan of Action: What would military intervention in Darfur look like? You might be surprised

by David L. Englin
The New Republic Online, Aug. 6, 2004

The U.N. Security Council passed a resolution last Friday giving the government of Sudan 30 days to comply with its July 3 agreement to put a stop to violence against civilians in Darfur and to allow aid through to the 1.2 million people in refugee camps, or else. Or else what remains to be seen--the watered-down resolution doesn't specify--but the ghosts of Auschwitz and Rwanda are clearly haunting the concerned nations of the world, military intervention may be on the horizon. (Britain, for one, has already said it would back such an intervention if Sudan doesn't put an end to the violence in Darfur.) Sudan's military is openly bracing for that possibility, calling the U.N. resolution a "declaration of war on Sudan," and the Sudanese government's actions to date suggest they are more interested in creating the illusion of compliance so they can continue their campaign of genocide. As pressure builds for action, it's important to step back and consider what an international military intervention in Sudan might require: the results of this exercise might surprise you.

Military action in Sudan should be designed to halt further attacks on civilians, ensure the safety of people already in refugee camps, and make sure humanitarian aid gets through to the people who need it.

To prevent continued attacks on villages and fleeing refugees, an intervention force should immediately establish a no-fly zone over affected areas in western Sudan. Fleeing refugees have reported Sudanese government warplanes strafing and bombing black African villages as a prelude to attacks by horse-mounted Janjaweed Arab militias, who swoop in to murder, rape, and pillage. In addition to these coordinated attacks from the air, Janjaweed leaders have used Sudanese government helicopters for command and control of their fast-moving cavalrymen, and witnesses have reported government helicopters supplying militiamen with food, arms, and equipment. A no-fly zone would directly prevent attacks on villages by Sudanese warplanes and helicopter gunships, as well as disrupt command and control and logistical support for the Janjaweed.

While establishing a no-fly zone would be essential, it would be a mistake to underestimate Sudan's ability to defend the sovereignty of its airspace. Although its population remains horribly impoverished, Sudan has used its substantial oil revenues to more than double the size of its air force since 2000. Over the past four years, Sudan has purchased at least 34 new fighter jets from China, including a dozen Shenyang F-7 supersonic jets. Russia has already supplied Sudan with a large number of MiG-24 Hind helicopter gunships, and it recently sold Sudan a dozen fourth-generation MiG-29 fighter jets, which are considered to be on par with the most advanced U.S. fighters. Both China and Russia have supplied Sudan with modern radar stations for command and control. It is not clear who flies Sudan's more advanced warplanes, and some have suggested that Russian mercenary pilots may be involved. In any case, this is not an air force to be taken lightly. An intervention force would want to employ the kind of high-tech, "network-centric" warfare that has become standard U.S. strategy. This kind of aerospace warfare links together advanced combat jets, satellites, manned and unmanned surveillance, intelligence, and command and control aircraft, and operatives on the ground. French air bases west of Sudan in Chad and French and U.S. bases east of Sudan in Djibouti are well situated to support no-fly zone operations, as are American bases in Saudi Arabia, and aircraft carriers in the Red Sea. Using systems and techniques proven over Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, intervention force pilots could successfully keep Sudan's warplanes and helicopters out of Darfur--but they should be prepared to fight a modern enemy if Sudan chooses to defend its airspace.

While clearing the skies would go a long way toward preventing further attacks, an intervention force should also create Janjaweed-free safe havens on the ground. This would require conventional ground forces to establish checkpoints, conduct patrols, and forcibly disarm militiamen. This force would also be responsible for the physical security of the actual refugee camps. Over the past several weeks, a number of reports have described the Janjaweed preying on the women and girls who have been driven into these camps. The Sudanese government has used bureaucratic red-tape to keep food and aid from getting into the camps, and starvation and disease are finishing the work the Janjaweed started. With hundreds of people starving to death each day, refugees resort to foraging for straw, grass, and firewood beyond the camps' perimeters, but these peripheral areas are still controlled by the Janjaweed. Men and boys who venture from the camps face certain death, so women and girls go out, often before dawn, when they hope militiamen will still be asleep. Tragically, these women and girls--some as young as eight years old--are being systematically captured and raped by the Janjaweed. Cynically responding to international pressure to properly secure refugee camps, the government of Sudan in some cases has reinforced camp security with Janjaweed militiamen. The ground arm of an international intervention force ought to immediately take over responsibility for camp security and include camp peripheries in established safe zones.

The other security challenge for both ground and air forces is making sure humanitarian aid gets through as soon as possible. By some estimates, as many as 1,000 people are dying each day in refugee camps because of disease and starvation and less than half of the food and humanitarian aid needed is getting through. Part of the problem is that aid has not been forthcoming from wealthy donor nations. Only a handful of nations--notably the United States, Britain, Norway, and the Netherlands--have made significant financial contributions, and the United Nations is struggling to come up with the $350 million it needs in food, medicine, supplies, and equipment. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan recently issued direct appeals to several wealthy nations in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

Not waiting for individual countries to commit military airlift resources, the U.N.'s World Food Program over the weekend began airlifting food and aid to parts of Darfur unreachable over land because of flooding now that Sudan's rainy season has arrived. Ramiro Lopes Da Silva, the World Food Program's Sudan country director, said this new effort would surpass the Berlin Airlift, during which American, British, and French military aircraft transported more than 2.3 million tons of humanitarian cargo between June 1948 and September 1949 to successfully break the Soviet blockade of Berlin. As long as Annan successfully raises the money necessary to fund the operation, this negates the need for a massive military airlift, which is welcome news for American military pilots, who are already being worked to bone. In addition to airlift efforts, if all of the money requested comes in, then other transportation requirements will also be met, since the U.N. aid request list includes things like helicopters, trucks, and associated support equipment.

However, in the past, even when the aid and the means to transport it have been there, the government of Sudan has used onerous visa and travel permit requirements to restrict shipments. If that kind of obstructionism continues, intervention ground forces might have to seize control of key transit points to open the appropriate borders. While a no-fly zone would help keep U.N. aircraft safe in flight, ground forces would also have to ensure safe locations on the ground for aid shipments to be dropped and then delivered into the hands of refugees. Once the aid is on its way to the camps, the extent to which shipments would need military escorts would depend on the security situation. If the combination of no-fly zones in the air and safe zones on the ground kept Janjaweed and government forces far enough from refugee camps and transit routes, that would lessen the need for aid convoys to be escorted by military forces. That might work sufficiently for aid coming into Sudan from Chad, which borders Darfur; however, aid still coming in over land from the east would have to cross right through the middle of Sudan, which would be a much more dangerous prospect.

All of which raises the question of just how many ground troops an intervention force might require? Reports coming out of the Rwandan genocide suggest that as few as 1,000 to 2,000 troops could have provided the security necessary to prevent the deaths of 800,000 people. The African Union announced plans Wednesday to send 2,000 troops to Darfur. Britain's top general has said he could muster 5,000 troops for Sudan and France has 1,000 troops already stationed in neighboring Chad, including many from the vaunted French Foreign Legion. (With the U.S. military already stretched thin in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has officially demurred on the issue of sending troops.) It is not clear, however, if military intervention on the ground in Sudan would look more like Rwanda or more like Somalia, where 26,000 American troops were sent into a hostile environment to secure and deliver humanitarian aid. Rwanda was about one ethnic group murdering another. In Somalia, warring clans fought over control of humanitarian aid, and military force was necessary to get aid to the people who needed it.

While an intervention force establishing no-fly zones in the air, safe zones on the ground, and secure transit routes for aid shipments might take care of the immediate problem, each of these alone constitutes a serious violation of Sudanese sovereignty, and together they amount to a full-on invasion of western Sudan. Hopefully, the government of Sudan, faced with this prospect, would act quickly itself to disarm and demobilize the Janjaweed, stop government forces from participating in any more violence, and let aid through. As things stand right now, however, Sudan's leaders have said that any attempt to use force to intervene will be met with force. Therefore, the international community needs to be fully prepared to engage and defeat the Sudanese military. Establishing a no-fly zone against an advanced, hostile Sudanese air force would almost certainly require offensive attacks on Sudan's airfields, aircraft, and command and control system. Pushing into Darfur to force open border crossings, drive out or disarm resistant Janjaweed, and establish safe zones around refugee camps would require a significant commitment of ground troops, probably many more than the 7,000 or so British, French, African Union, and Australian troops already being considered. And if concerned nations are serious about military intervention, they had better make sure they have the stomach to endure casualties in what could turn out to be a bloody fight. If not, then they had better make sure they have the stomach to stand by while, once again, hundreds of thousands of Africans are brutally extinguished by their own government.