As David noted, Steve Rosenthal spent a couple dozen paragraphs defending his organization's efforts in Ohio in the Washington Post his morning.
His conclusion that Bush's message resonated better than Kerry's, er, lack of message, is painfully, obviously valid. His piling on to the oft reported conclusion that the early-trumpeted influence of the so-called "values" voters was a dramatic overstatement is a welcome addition to the wealth of smart people making that case. However, his attempt to debunk the "myth" of the stellar GOP mobilization in Ohio is incredibly weak. (Just as Rosenthal appropriately acknowledged his stake in making the case that Kerry didn't lose on the ground, I've got to acknowledge my stake in proving him wrong - my silence here would earn me ribbing for at least the next election cycle, given my many posts, here and elsewhere, like this one.)
First, Rosenthal says that the Republican effort couldn't have been all that because
Turnout in Democratic-leaning counties in Ohio was up 8.7 percent while turnout in Republican-leaning counties was up slightly less, at 6.3 percent. John Kerry bested Bush in Cuyahoga County (home of Cleveland) by 218,000 votes -- an increase of 42,497 over Gore's 2000 effort. In Stark County (Canton) -- a bellwether lost by Gore -- Kerry won by 4,354.
What he conveniently leaves out is that while the increase in turnout numbers in Democratic versus Republican strongholds wasn't too bad for Democrats, the Republicans did a much better job of turning out
their voters in those areas. In 78 of 88 Ohio counties, the percentage of Bush voters was higher this year than in 2000. So, even in most of the counties Bush lost he picked up a greater percentage of the vote than he did last time. Add that up across 78 counties, and it's easy to see how even dramatic victories in Ohio's six big-city counties weren't enough for a Kerry win, even with more voting there.
Just looking at the voter turnout numbers, Rosenthal glosses over the fact that while the average increases in Democratic- versus Repulican-leaning counties wasn't too far off, in many of the individual counties that "lean" most heavily Republican turnout was in fact through the roof. In Delaware County, for example, where Bush won with 66% of the vote, turnout was up by 43%.
Forty-three percent. Turnout in Cuyahoga County (Kerry's with 67%) was up by 13.5%.
Next, Rosenthal claims that this:
Among Ohio's rural and exurban voters, Bush beat Kerry by just five points among newly registered voters and by a mere two points among infrequent voters (those who did not vote in 2000).
somehow debunks the idea that newly registered voters in the suburbs and exurbs carried the day. Maybe Mr. Rosenthal forgot to notice that Ohio was lost by about 2.5%. It seems to me that the 2-5 point margin for Bush among new and infrequent voters is not insignificant, given the margin. Setting aside the numbers for a moment, let's stand back and note that, by however small a margin,
Bush won the new voters in surburban, exurban, and rural OH. Wasn't this supposed to be the election where disaffection with the clearly incompetent President would turn out droves of people coming out of the woodwork just to vote against him? Hmmmm....let's return to our discussion of how we can be a
credible alternative, shall we?
Finally, Rosenthal takes on the "myth" that Republicans ran a superior, volunteer-driven mobilization effort.
When we asked new voters in rural and exurban areas who contacted them during this campaign, we learned that they were just as likely to hear from the Kerry campaign and its allies as from the Bush side. (In contrast, regular voters reported more contact from the GOP.)
(. . .) Much has been made of the Republican effort to turn out voters through personal contact. Yet our poll shows that voters in these Republican counties were just as likely to be visited by a Kerry supporter at their homes as by a Bush supporter. Fewer than 2 percent were visited by a Bush supporter whom they knew personally.
The fact that new voters heard from Kerry and Bush people with equal frequency certainly bolsters Rosenthal's claim (preceded and no doubt echoed by every Democrat who's written anything on the election) that Bush won them over because he had a strong message. The second part of that paragraph is telling, though: reliable voters heard from Bush more often, and lo' and behold, they voted for him more reliably. That's evidence in favor of the GOP's approach to field in Ohio, not that they were somehow less impressive than it seems.
I can't imagine Mr. Rosenthal is being willfully deceptive in trumpeting his finding that just 2% of voters in Republican counties had been "visited by a Bush supporter whom they knew personally," as evidence of the GOP plan's failure, but he is absolutely dodging the key point. The argument has never been that voters must be contacted by people they know personally, but that
local volunteers are better than imported campaign workers (volunteer or otherwise). It's fair to surmise that either they didn't bother asking that question, or ACT found (predictably) that OH voters had in fact been contacted more frequently by Bush supporters from their neighborhood than by Kerry supporters from their neighborhood. Anyone who's made voter ID and persuasion calls can attest (I know I can, and David will back me up on this), whether you know your neighbors or not, it's extremely effective to start a conversation with, "I live around the corner from you." Research shows that it's far more effective than, "I came to Ohio from Connecticut because I think you should vote for Kerry," or some equivalent. It's the basis of the 72 Hour Plan, and the "Virtual Precinct Captain" tools and other tactics that made up the extremely effective GOP ground game in Ohio and nationwide.
Steve Rosenthal and ACT did tremendous work and certainly built a foundation for voter mobilization efforts in elections to come. It was a commendable effort. But it failed in Ohio (and elsewhere). A crappy candidate with no message helped pave the path to failure, but it was a failure. He - and we - can defend what ACT, et al, did and try to diminish what the GOP did on the ground to beat us, or we can learn from it and fight back not just harder, but better, in 2006 and beyond. Rosenthal's defense doesn't inspire my optimism that we'll pursue the latter course.