My thanks to Colette for clarifying the point about legitimacy, as well as the most recent posts by David and Dean, which I think bring us, or at least me, back around to my earlier question about creating political pressure within the institution for action. David suggests that what gives NATO legitimacy is the "sovereignty of the individual states contributing to that force." I'd argue that it's also the commitment each state has to supporting the aims, and even the mere existence, of NATO--something that is clearly lacking with the UN. As Dean points out, the US probably would never support the idea of a UN standing army--in part, because the US does not wholeheartedly (or, many times, even half-heartedly) support the UN itself. If the question is how to make the UN a powerful and effective force at stopping or preventing genocide, the most important step is to rebuild (or, perhaps, build) the "social contract" that Colette refers to between the body and its members. This task requires political acuity and deftness and probably lies at the feet of UN officials and administrators, who must create a political climate whereby countries (most notably, but not solely, the US) feel that the legitimacy of the UN as an institution is in their interest. Once that's the case, I think its authority to intervene in crises like the one in Darfur is greatly increased; and if countries are invested in the reputation and the success of the UN, then I'd bet at least some of the problems it faces in gathering and deploying force when necessarily will go away as countries see the fates of the UN and themselves aligned.

A UN standing army will never happen, in very large part because the U.S. will never support one. A way to finesse it might be for troop contributing countries to dedicate within their own armed forces special military units, which remain on high alert at all times, whose sole function would be to deploy to crisis spots on short notice. There are obvious problems here, too -- such as how the command structure would work, the mechanics of transfering the job to a more traditional peacekeeping force once the more serious violence tapers off, and so on. Regardless, if the aim of our proposed modernization is to head off future Darfurs and Rwandas, I think a plan for quick intervention by well-equipped, well-trained multinational soldiers with a clear mandate about use of force needs to be part of the deal. Gaining that clear mandate would be a challenge -- and a rapid reaction forces won't do much good if the Security Council dithers over codicils while people die.

On moral legitimacy: I have a lot of respect for Colette's eloquent arguments. But I confess I am not worried about the moral legitimacy of peacekeepers sanctioned by the Security Council using force. The U.S., France and UK have vetoes on the Council, and there are usually at least three other real democracies serving at a given time. When all 15 countries agree to deploy peacekeepers to handle a crisis, it is usually because the U.S., UK or France pushed hard to do so -- not because we caved to pressure from non-democracies. That's a lot more moral legitimacy than the Janjaweed or the Bosnian Serbs have/had. I know, Colette, that your points were in the context of the UN Standing Army idea, but I did want to throw my two cents in here. If there WERE a UNSA, my bet is it would only be able to deploy with Council approval.

Since I took a pretty good--and appropriate--lashing from Traci, let me see if I can do a better job spelling out what I mean. And since this is such a complicated subject, I'm going to take just one piece of it.

Traci challenges me with:

"In response to Colette's difficult question about legitimacy--this question is a fair one, but it greatly troubles me. It seems to me that if we don't agree that on its face the U.N. or something like it is (or can be) a legitimate body, then this entire conversation is not worth our time..."

I think there are different kinds of legitimacy for a body like the United Nations. There is much about it that is legitimate. Besides, I think it's clear that we cannot function without anarchy on this planet without some governing bodies, even if we are not set up with the true concept of global citizenship required to convey the ultimate, bonafide, genuine legitimacy on them.

But we were talking about a particular kind of legitimacy--the kind that allows you to have a standing army and make war. What I was trying to get at was that there must exist a certain social contract between a body, the people it represents, and other bodies in order to have that particular legitimacy. While the contract of the sovereign state may not be the best way, it's the one we've thought out, and part of what gives that social contract legitimacy is that there is a solid concept of the citizenry that state represents, an express contract to provide for the security of that citizenry, and an express understanding (Westphalia) of the legitimacy that being a sovereign state conveys on the right to have and bear arms.

I read a piece yesterday that Mark Juergensmeyer of UC Santa Barbara wrote for a working paper series at Harvard. In talking about the violent acts of terrorists, he says, "The very act of killing on behalf of a moral code is a political statement. Such acts break the state's monopoly on morally sanctioned killing. By putting the right to take life in their own hands, the perpetrators of religious violence make a daring claim of power on behalf of the powerless, a basis of legitimacy for public order other than that on which the secular state relies."

What I honed in on in that passage was the idea that the state has had a monopoly on morally sanctioned killing. With the UN, we're looking at a pretty broken decision making structure, a set of international norms established there that are not bought into by a significant portion of the world (see pieces of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example) a great-powers, and Western-powers-heavy balance of influence, and no true concept of global citizenship backing it up. So, I need more help thinking through what, very specifically, gives this body the moral legitimacy to use force that is usually reserved for states. There is a bar that is different for morally-sanctioned killing than it is, say, for being sanctioned to participate in trade. I think people arguing to give a standing army to the UN are arguing that the UN has crossed that bar, and I need to see the critical thinking that demonstrates it has. I don't see it. Maybe it's there, but I need to see that thinking clearly articulated.

I hope this makes more sense.