U.N. Troops Are Necessary--and Legitimate

Setting aside the discussion about democracies, I'd like to go back to the part of David's proposal that relates to creating a standing U.N. military. The more I think about it, the more I think this is necessary, at least in the context of this discussion--the U.N.'s ability to prevent genocide. In part, it's a logistics issue--we discuss, we debate, we sign U.S. House and Senate Resolutions, we finally all agree whose troops will go in and who will foot the bill, and then Rwanda's trucks need new tires and any tiny bit of momentum we've built to address the problem goes down the drain. But in part, it's a solution to a tiny part of the political issue I mentioned in my last post. As things stand now, it's easy not to act. We can all sit around and point fingers at each other and say that we'd like to move, but we can't, because there are so many details to be worked out in so many different venues. If the U.N. has the ability to make a decision and immediately deploy troops to enforce that decision, the opportunity for conveniently blaming some other actor in the system is suddenly significantly less. I don't know whether the specific numbers are right, but I think you're on track with the structure of how providing troops for this force would work.

In response to Colette's difficult question about legitimacy--this question is a fair one, but it greatly troubles me. It seems to me that if we don't agree that on its face the U.N. or something like it is (or can be) a legitimate body, then this entire conversation is not worth our time. I'm glad you pushed, but I'm going to push back, specifically on the things that you cited as problems with the U.N.'s ability to function as a legitimate enforcer of a global social contract (I like that phrasing):

-Western powerhouses: to the extent that military and economic powerhouses ARE Western, I don't see any way around that. To the extent that they're not, isn't David's proposal about the countries that make up the Security Council trying to address that? How is it falling down?
-poor operations: valid concern. Of the three, I find this the most persuasive challenge to U.N. legitimacy. My guess is that if the U.S. fully committed to the idea of a functioning, functional U.N. it could happen. One of the things the current Administration has done really well (but by no means perfectly) is increase accountability for government-funded agencies and operations. If we took the same approach to our dealings with the United Nations--sort of a "No Nation Left Behind" approach (yeah, okay, that doesn't really work, but I couldn't think of a better one)--I bet we could turn this ship around. Instead, we choose to play hot-and-cold with the U.N. and at least allow, if not actively aid and abet, its management dysfunction.
-illegitimate members: I think this gets you into a real Catch-22. If you can't be legitimate because you don't have everyone at the table, but having everyone at the table requires allowing "illegitimate" members, thus rendering you illegitimate, then what exactly is the membership scenario under which you can possibly be a legitimate body?

I wonder if the question of whether we can create an international body that every world actor will admit is legitimate is a red herring. I'd guess that there will always be countries in situations in which they deem the U.N. (or some replacement) to be an illegitimate actor, and other situations in which they do not. The U.S. is touting the legitimacy of the U.N. in Darfur; we shunned it in Iraq. I don't mean to imply that I think legitimacy isn't important--it absolutely is. I'm just not sure how far you can take that criterion.