Back to the political question

My thanks to Colette for clarifying the point about legitimacy, as well as the most recent posts by David and Dean, which I think bring us, or at least me, back around to my earlier question about creating political pressure within the institution for action. David suggests that what gives NATO legitimacy is the "sovereignty of the individual states contributing to that force." I'd argue that it's also the commitment each state has to supporting the aims, and even the mere existence, of NATO--something that is clearly lacking with the UN. As Dean points out, the US probably would never support the idea of a UN standing army--in part, because the US does not wholeheartedly (or, many times, even half-heartedly) support the UN itself. If the question is how to make the UN a powerful and effective force at stopping or preventing genocide, the most important step is to rebuild (or, perhaps, build) the "social contract" that Colette refers to between the body and its members. This task requires political acuity and deftness and probably lies at the feet of UN officials and administrators, who must create a political climate whereby countries (most notably, but not solely, the US) feel that the legitimacy of the UN as an institution is in their interest. Once that's the case, I think its authority to intervene in crises like the one in Darfur is greatly increased; and if countries are invested in the reputation and the success of the UN, then I'd bet at least some of the problems it faces in gathering and deploying force when necessarily will go away as countries see the fates of the UN and themselves aligned.