On the legitimacy question

Since I took a pretty good--and appropriate--lashing from Traci, let me see if I can do a better job spelling out what I mean. And since this is such a complicated subject, I'm going to take just one piece of it.

Traci challenges me with:

"In response to Colette's difficult question about legitimacy--this question is a fair one, but it greatly troubles me. It seems to me that if we don't agree that on its face the U.N. or something like it is (or can be) a legitimate body, then this entire conversation is not worth our time..."

I think there are different kinds of legitimacy for a body like the United Nations. There is much about it that is legitimate. Besides, I think it's clear that we cannot function without anarchy on this planet without some governing bodies, even if we are not set up with the true concept of global citizenship required to convey the ultimate, bonafide, genuine legitimacy on them.

But we were talking about a particular kind of legitimacy--the kind that allows you to have a standing army and make war. What I was trying to get at was that there must exist a certain social contract between a body, the people it represents, and other bodies in order to have that particular legitimacy. While the contract of the sovereign state may not be the best way, it's the one we've thought out, and part of what gives that social contract legitimacy is that there is a solid concept of the citizenry that state represents, an express contract to provide for the security of that citizenry, and an express understanding (Westphalia) of the legitimacy that being a sovereign state conveys on the right to have and bear arms.

I read a piece yesterday that Mark Juergensmeyer of UC Santa Barbara wrote for a working paper series at Harvard. In talking about the violent acts of terrorists, he says, "The very act of killing on behalf of a moral code is a political statement. Such acts break the state's monopoly on morally sanctioned killing. By putting the right to take life in their own hands, the perpetrators of religious violence make a daring claim of power on behalf of the powerless, a basis of legitimacy for public order other than that on which the secular state relies."

What I honed in on in that passage was the idea that the state has had a monopoly on morally sanctioned killing. With the UN, we're looking at a pretty broken decision making structure, a set of international norms established there that are not bought into by a significant portion of the world (see pieces of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example) a great-powers, and Western-powers-heavy balance of influence, and no true concept of global citizenship backing it up. So, I need more help thinking through what, very specifically, gives this body the moral legitimacy to use force that is usually reserved for states. There is a bar that is different for morally-sanctioned killing than it is, say, for being sanctioned to participate in trade. I think people arguing to give a standing army to the UN are arguing that the UN has crossed that bar, and I need to see the critical thinking that demonstrates it has. I don't see it. Maybe it's there, but I need to see that thinking clearly articulated.

I hope this makes more sense.

Let us extend the discussion by another 30 days

Today marks 30 days since we started this project and said that, in the spirit of recent Security Council resolutions, initially this would be a 30-day effort. As we are gradually moving in a constructive direction and are nowhere near a concrete conclusion, let us extend the discussion by another 30 days (also in the spirit of recent resolutions.)

U.N. Troops Are Necessary--and Legitimate

Setting aside the discussion about democracies, I'd like to go back to the part of David's proposal that relates to creating a standing U.N. military. The more I think about it, the more I think this is necessary, at least in the context of this discussion--the U.N.'s ability to prevent genocide. In part, it's a logistics issue--we discuss, we debate, we sign U.S. House and Senate Resolutions, we finally all agree whose troops will go in and who will foot the bill, and then Rwanda's trucks need new tires and any tiny bit of momentum we've built to address the problem goes down the drain. But in part, it's a solution to a tiny part of the political issue I mentioned in my last post. As things stand now, it's easy not to act. We can all sit around and point fingers at each other and say that we'd like to move, but we can't, because there are so many details to be worked out in so many different venues. If the U.N. has the ability to make a decision and immediately deploy troops to enforce that decision, the opportunity for conveniently blaming some other actor in the system is suddenly significantly less. I don't know whether the specific numbers are right, but I think you're on track with the structure of how providing troops for this force would work.

In response to Colette's difficult question about legitimacy--this question is a fair one, but it greatly troubles me. It seems to me that if we don't agree that on its face the U.N. or something like it is (or can be) a legitimate body, then this entire conversation is not worth our time. I'm glad you pushed, but I'm going to push back, specifically on the things that you cited as problems with the U.N.'s ability to function as a legitimate enforcer of a global social contract (I like that phrasing):

-Western powerhouses: to the extent that military and economic powerhouses ARE Western, I don't see any way around that. To the extent that they're not, isn't David's proposal about the countries that make up the Security Council trying to address that? How is it falling down?
-poor operations: valid concern. Of the three, I find this the most persuasive challenge to U.N. legitimacy. My guess is that if the U.S. fully committed to the idea of a functioning, functional U.N. it could happen. One of the things the current Administration has done really well (but by no means perfectly) is increase accountability for government-funded agencies and operations. If we took the same approach to our dealings with the United Nations--sort of a "No Nation Left Behind" approach (yeah, okay, that doesn't really work, but I couldn't think of a better one)--I bet we could turn this ship around. Instead, we choose to play hot-and-cold with the U.N. and at least allow, if not actively aid and abet, its management dysfunction.
-illegitimate members: I think this gets you into a real Catch-22. If you can't be legitimate because you don't have everyone at the table, but having everyone at the table requires allowing "illegitimate" members, thus rendering you illegitimate, then what exactly is the membership scenario under which you can possibly be a legitimate body?

I wonder if the question of whether we can create an international body that every world actor will admit is legitimate is a red herring. I'd guess that there will always be countries in situations in which they deem the U.N. (or some replacement) to be an illegitimate actor, and other situations in which they do not. The U.S. is touting the legitimacy of the U.N. in Darfur; we shunned it in Iraq. I don't mean to imply that I think legitimacy isn't important--it absolutely is. I'm just not sure how far you can take that criterion.

You're right

Good point, David. I'd lost track of that aspect of your original proposal.

I'm not shutting anyone out from global governance

Colette - I want to be crystal clear that I'm absolutely not proposing to "shut out from global governance all states that aren't democracies, or even loosely considered democracies." The democracy criteria is strictly limited to new permanent veto-wielding members of the Security Council. (Note "new." Even a non-democracy like China would maintain its status by virtue of being an original member.) As I stated in my original proposal, "That doesn't mean those countries get excluded from the U.N., or even from the Security Council. It only means they don't get permanent, veto-wielding membership (unless they already have it as part of the original five.)"

Still not convinced

Yeah, I guess I'm still not convinced that we should require a democratic form of government. In addition to the arguments I made previously, while, as far as history has taught us, it's the worst form of government except for all the others, I question how smart or strategic it is to shut out from global governance all states that aren't democracies, or even loosely considered democracies. That's a pretty good portion of the globe.

Do I think Libya should chair a human rights commitee? No. But do I think we want them at the table, yes. We're seeing all to clearly what disenfranchised people do when denied a seat at the table...even when legitimately denied such a seat. If our goal is to increase peace and security, I think we can't just turn our backs and only talk to "people like us."

Inalienable rights

Commenter Joe writes: "There are a couple of rights in the Universal Declaration that I don't find essential to a democracy such as the right to paid vacation in Art. 24. Not that I don't think they're desirable, just not essential." This is an excellent point, and perhaps the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is too high a standard for a basic definition of democracy. What I'm really getting at is that there are fundamental, inalienable rights that go beyond those instrumental to the functioning of a democracy (i.e. free speech, free press, free association) that must still be part of any bare minimum definition of democracy. For example, a society with fair and open elections, a free press, free speech, and free association where the government still had the power to execute people arbitrarily would not count as a legitimately minimal democracy for our purposes.

Democracy and a U.N. military force

There's nothing annoying about thoughtful debate, Colette. I think your concern about democracy depends on how we define it for the purpose of this particular criterion. I would argue for the following definition:

• "Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." Government authority must flow from some form of active public consent, and not from family lineage or religious dogma. This would exclude monarchies like Saudi Arabia, but not constitutional monarchies like Britain and Spain.
• The nation must agree to and abide by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
• The nation protects free speech and free press.

Nations that meet these broad criteria grant basic rights to minorities, allow people to participate in their own governance, and protect the mechanisms that allow people to make informed choices about their governance. If they abide by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it means they grant religious freedom and other basic rights. This is probably the bare minimum definition of democracy, and it could certainly apply to nations grounded in a particular religious faith. There are forms of government that are flat out wrong and illegitimate and shouldn't be granted both the power and legitimacy that permanent, veto-wielding Security Council status would confer. That doesn't mean those countries get excluded from the U.N., or even from the Security Council. It only means they don't get permanent, veto-wielding membership (unless they already have it as part of the original five.)

On the issue of a standing, transnational U.N. force, this is obviously something that has never been done before. As I mentioned, I have a lot to say about this that I didn't include in the last post, so let me expand on the idea. This would be an all-volunteer force of men and women from the armed forces of their respective nations who agree to subjugate themselves to a standing U.N. military chain-of-command. The force could only be employed by a vote of the Security Council. Since contributors to this force by definition would have veto power, they would have the power to prevent sending their 2,000 people into harm's way. By making it a permanent, standing force, troops from several different nations would work and train together as a matter of course, overcoming the serious problem with ad-hoc U.N. forces and creating a credible deterrent to nations like Sudan. At the end of the day, any contributing nation could still withdraw its 2,000 troops, but it would be giving up "permanent," veto-wielding Security Council membership.

In response to David's proposals

I fear this will be one of those annoying postings that only points out the problems, not the solutions. So let me say first that I am on board with a good bit of what David suggests below. It is because I am that I find myself zeroing in on a couple of points on which I'd like to push back.

The first is the requirement that each member send 2,000 troops to a standing UN force. My problem is that I can't quite get myself to agreeing with the concept of a standing UN force. I get hung up on the question of legitimacy. This is very hard to explain succinctly, but we're in no-man's land about who can legitimately claim the right to use and then execute the use of force. Clearly, we don't like the simple equation of sovereignty = ability to have an army and use it. On the other hand, we haven't really established an alternative set of criteria. And given how Western the UN is in its powerhouses, how poorly it operates, how illegitimate some of its members are, etc., etc., I'm not sure it can claim the kind of global social contract with citizens of the world required for it to legitimately exercise the use of force through a standing army on those citizens' behalf.

Then we get to the requirement that security council members be democracies. I know this is liberal heresy, and given that I'm fairly liberal, I hesitate to commit said heresy, but I'm not convinced that's a legitimate criterion, either. Let me see if I can argue this out.

A) I feel like there's a decent portion of the globe that leans toward some form of theocracy. They have a strong desire to live as a collective in a state whose laws and principals are grounded in one faith or another and its accompanying canons. B) I don't see that humanity has yet figured out a functioning model of democracy that permits for that particular kind of self-determination (and if you think Israel is a good example, I withhold my judgement until we see what happens if and when a simple majority of the voting population becomes non-Jewish, or specifically Muslim, which could happen). C) I'm also not yet convinced that we can't find such a democratic model. D) Institutionalizing democracy as the only legitimate form of government for participation in global governance now essentially means institutionalizing a specific form(s) of democracy that may be insufficient. E) Therefore, are we sure that, in order to function well, the Security Council of the United Nations really should make room only for those nations that currently function as democracies?

Some proposals for consideration...

I think the discussion is starting to move in a very productive direction. Dean makes a strong case both for making South Africa a permanent, veto-wielding member of the Security Council and for asking permanent members of the Security Council to give their U.N. representatives cabinet-level status. Traci is absolutely right about the lack of political cost for national leaders who ignore genocide and about the very real need for some kind of military response in these cases. Colette also makes a strong case that a long-term, systemic solution has to go beyond focusing on a particular country and look more to objective criteria that will hold up over time.

Here's are some ideas, based on all of those great thoughts:

First, I think we have to acknowledge the political and diplomatic reality that we're not simply going to take away permanent status from any of the current permanent members, whatever we may think of them. That said, as others have noted, we could add permanent members, but I wonder if we might also establish criteria for continued membership that would apply to all? In other words, the U.S., Britain, France, China, and Russia start out as permanent members, we add to that group whatever nations we decide (through criteria I'll suggest in a moment), but then we lay out conditions each nation, including the original five, would have to meet or else lose its permanent seat.

Setting aside for a moment the question of how we choose permanent members, we could require that each permanent member confer cabinet/ministerial-level status on its U.N. representative and contribute 2,000 troops to a standing U.N. force that can be deployed at the direction of the Security Council. If any nation, even among the original five, fails to do either of these two things, it loses its permanent seat.

On deciding who gets permanent membership, Colette is right that we need objective criteria. I would suggest that, in addition to the original five, each major world region get one seat, and that it go to the most populace democracy that is willing to meet the membership conditions set out above. A seat could go unfilled if no democracy exists in the region.

We'd need to nail down what we mean by "major world region." (Are we talking just populated continents, which includes Australia, but excludes the Middle East? Or do we do something more like North America, South America, Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East?) We'd also need to nail down a measurable definition of "democracy," which I think we could do.

Every 25 years, the Security Council would review the status of these "permanent" members to make sure each is still the most populace democracy in its region. If another democracy has become more populace, it takes the seat. If a sitting member has lapsed into non-democracy, it loses the seat. The original five start out with their seats (so China and Russia don't have to worry about the democracy criterion), but lose them if they fail to provide the 2,000 troops or to grant cabinet rank to their representative. At that point, they get treated just like everyone else.

This would give us a veto-wielding membership that looks something like this: U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France, South Africa, India, Brazil, Germany, Mexico.

This would also give the U.N. a standing force of 20,000 troops. (I have a lot more to say about the idea of a transnational U.N. military force, but that's a different post.)

Mixed feelings on South Africa suggestion

What I like about the South Africa suggestion is that it is an attempt to recognize a) that the humanitarian aspect of the UN's role is critical and legitimate; b) that, at least for now, Africa is central to the humanitarian agenda; and c) involving and motivating centers of power is necessary for success.

What concerns me, however, is that it's a tactical suggestion. Changes to the UN, its membership, its structure, etc., should, in my opinion, be made on lasting, objective criteria. South Africa is a power player in Africa now, and Africa is central to the humanitarian agenda now, but making permanent changes based on current policy situations just locks us in to another unsatisfactory design when the centers of gravity shift again.

I could see, perhaps, setting up objective criteria for regional representation based on certain demographic principals...criteria South Africa might very well fit. But that's different than the original suggestion.

two proposals

I found Traci's last comment inspired and inspiring. As such, I thought I'd throw out two proposals that might make the Security Council marginally more effective in dealing with crises such as Darfur:

1. Make South Africa a permanent, veto-wielding member of the Council. So much of the Council's day-to-day work focuses on crises and ongoing peacekeeping operations in Africa. Despite my earlier skepticism about regional cooperation, I do think South Africa could bring special understanding to the table when it comes to handling Darfuresque disasters. Plus, South Africa's credibility on the continent would soar as a member of the P-6, which would make any peacekeeping mission led or strongly supported by them more muscular. Moreover, it is a vibrant democracy that has for the most part dealt admirably with past demons, an example other African countries might do well to emulate. Francophone African nations may gripe about lack of representation, but the fact is, no Francophone African nation has the international gravitas of South Africa.

2. Member governments should confer cabinet level (ministerial level) rank on all P-6 Permanent Representatives. This would involve the Permreps more forcefully in policy debates at the top level of their governments. During much of the Clinton Administration, our UN Ambassador had cabinet rank; his/her involvement in highest level meetings helped principal decisionmakers understand what was on the line when the Council had to deal with crises. In addition, having high-level reps at the table would give governments more of a political stake in the success or failure of Council actions. Millions of caveats here, I know -- for one thing, cabinet/ministerial rank for Permreps would imply that a capital actually takes the UN process seriously.

Washington Post supports Dean

An editorial on Darfur has become a weekly exercise for the Washington Post, which as done a reasonable job trying to keep the issue on the radar of its largely inside-the-beltway audience. This week's installment highlights both the problem with regional security organizations and the problem with lack of "great power" military involvement that Dean notes:

Then there is the African Union itself. Its leaders have been offering loudly to send troops to Darfur. But now that they are faced with a government that welcomes them, they say it will take another two or three weeks to win approval from all member governments for the deployment. In another measure of the African Union's urgent commitment to combating genocide, its officials recently delayed a meeting on Darfur on the ground that they had not received the per diem they thought due them.

Finally there is the role of the United States and its allies. The Bush administration is comfortable pushing resolutions through the Security Council and then calling upon the African Union to deploy: "My hope is that the African Union moves rapidly to help save lives," Mr. Bush declared in the debate on Thursday. But if he is serious about that hope, he needs to try harder to make the deployment happen. The United States needs to ensure that the mandate under which peacekeepers deploy is not restrictive. It must encourage the African Union to make haste. And it must get ready for the time when the African Union comes up with a firm deployment proposal. The African troops will need vehicles, helicopters and prefabricated housing. All this needs to be prepared now, in concert with other members of NATO. Otherwise the interminable delays in getting help to Darfur will stretch out even longer.

A concrete suggestion

I agree in large part with the path both David and Dean have been taking, and I’d like to be more concrete. It seems to me that the U.N. needs two things to make it a more effective actor against genocide:

1. Not just “leadership”, but a structure that forces action from its leaders. It's not about who the leaders are, or what they do, but what would force their hand. The problem for the U.N. in the Sudan isn’t that Burma and Iran are sitting at the table (as I think one could logically conclude both James and Matthew Yglesias are implying). The problem is that John Kerry and George W. Bush both stood at the presidential debate the other night and said what’s happening in the Sudan is genocide, and we’re not going to do anything significant to stop it. Yes, the U.S. has been talking about this issue a lot, more quickly and loudly than I think we have done in any other such situation. That’s not enough, though. Changing who sits on the Security Council, or changing veto power in the SC, or creating different international bodies altogether—I don’t think these proposals address the key problem, which is that no one ever pays a price (on this earth, anyway) for ignoring human rights abuses. Kerry and Bush know--heads of state around the world know--that there's virtually no political price to pay for ignoring genocide, while there's at least political risk of becoming involved. If we want to see action in such cases, I'd argue we have to change that calculus by creating pressure to act. How can we do this? I wonder if there’s something from our criminal justice system that could be instructive.

2. Genocide is stopped by military intervention. Period. The most generous offer the U.S. presidential candidates made was money and logistical support, but that only helps if there are effective troops to pay for and support. In some way, the U.N. has to be able to quickly deploy forces. The current reliance on donated troops doesn’t seem to work—we can never act quickly enough, and the coordination of different country’s militaries is extremely difficult (even more so if U.S. troops are involved, in part because of our refusal to follow anyone else’s command). Incidentally, I wonder if countries would be more inclined to support, even push for, intervention in the Sudan or similar situations if they knew they wouldn’t be asked to send members of their own military to the field (which I'd say would argue for creating a U.N. military structure).

naughty neighbors

On being overstretched: I'm not a military expert, but my understanding is that a) we ARE tied down in Iraq and b) other world leaders feel certain we are not likely to launch any major military action elsewhere in the world any time soon. What this means strategically is that the North Koreas and Irans of the world have zero fear we will do anything to block them no matter how badly they behave. Would Iran be playing cat and mouse with the IAEA if a) we were not utterly distracted by Iraq and b) we had poured more resources, energy and imaginativeness into helping Afghanistan transform itself into a viable, up-and-coming country? (It is unforgivable that the U.S. did not push early for international peacekeeping operations beyond Kabul.) Connecting this to North Korea is a bit of a stretch, but I do believe our tough stances would have more credibility if Iraq (or even Afghanistan) were going better right now.

On regional peacekeepers: Again, in my view peacekeeping missions only work when a major power, usually from outside the region in question, participates and takes a leading role. Countries often have sensitivities about their neighbors' aims -- look at the current interplay between Congo, Uganda and Rwanda. If there were regional peacekeepers for Chechnya, would they include Russians? (In Georgia, there is a CIS -- read Russian -- peacekeeping force separating the Georgians and the Abkhaz, and while the situation is hardly ideal, people are not killing each other at the same rate they were in the mid-1990s.) So, David, I think your idea has merit, but I am pessimistic about some areas being able to pull regional cooperation off. Europe couldn't do it in the Balkans without us; you'd think if anyone could succeed in this regard, the Euros could. Sorry to be such a sourpuss.