Back to the political question

My thanks to Colette for clarifying the point about legitimacy, as well as the most recent posts by David and Dean, which I think bring us, or at least me, back around to my earlier question about creating political pressure within the institution for action. David suggests that what gives NATO legitimacy is the "sovereignty of the individual states contributing to that force." I'd argue that it's also the commitment each state has to supporting the aims, and even the mere existence, of NATO--something that is clearly lacking with the UN. As Dean points out, the US probably would never support the idea of a UN standing army--in part, because the US does not wholeheartedly (or, many times, even half-heartedly) support the UN itself. If the question is how to make the UN a powerful and effective force at stopping or preventing genocide, the most important step is to rebuild (or, perhaps, build) the "social contract" that Colette refers to between the body and its members. This task requires political acuity and deftness and probably lies at the feet of UN officials and administrators, who must create a political climate whereby countries (most notably, but not solely, the US) feel that the legitimacy of the UN as an institution is in their interest. Once that's the case, I think its authority to intervene in crises like the one in Darfur is greatly increased; and if countries are invested in the reputation and the success of the UN, then I'd bet at least some of the problems it faces in gathering and deploying force when necessarily will go away as countries see the fates of the UN and themselves aligned.

UN Standing Army

A UN standing army will never happen, in very large part because the U.S. will never support one. A way to finesse it might be for troop contributing countries to dedicate within their own armed forces special military units, which remain on high alert at all times, whose sole function would be to deploy to crisis spots on short notice. There are obvious problems here, too -- such as how the command structure would work, the mechanics of transfering the job to a more traditional peacekeeping force once the more serious violence tapers off, and so on. Regardless, if the aim of our proposed modernization is to head off future Darfurs and Rwandas, I think a plan for quick intervention by well-equipped, well-trained multinational soldiers with a clear mandate about use of force needs to be part of the deal. Gaining that clear mandate would be a challenge -- and a rapid reaction forces won't do much good if the Security Council dithers over codicils while people die.

On moral legitimacy: I have a lot of respect for Colette's eloquent arguments. But I confess I am not worried about the moral legitimacy of peacekeepers sanctioned by the Security Council using force. The U.S., France and UK have vetoes on the Council, and there are usually at least three other real democracies serving at a given time. When all 15 countries agree to deploy peacekeepers to handle a crisis, it is usually because the U.S., UK or France pushed hard to do so -- not because we caved to pressure from non-democracies. That's a lot more moral legitimacy than the Janjaweed or the Bosnian Serbs have/had. I know, Colette, that your points were in the context of the UN Standing Army idea, but I did want to throw my two cents in here. If there WERE a UNSA, my bet is it would only be able to deploy with Council approval.

Look to NATO for an example of transnational military legitimacy

Colette raises a key point about state sovereignty as the source of legitimacy when it comes to the use of force. I think it's important to remember that the legitimacy of any collective, transnational military force flows directly from the sovereignty of the individual states contributing to that force. NATO is an instructive example of this kind of legitimacy in action. While ad-hoc contributions from NATO member states have been critical to its operations, NATO's military structure also includes both a standing chain of command and standing forces comprised of troops from NATO member states. For example, the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force flies E-3A AWACS aircraft out of a dedicated NATO air base at Geilenkirchen, Germany, with full-time integrated international crews. In many ways, the idea on the table is for a NATO-like U.N. force with an anti-genocide mandate instead of NATO's collective security mandate.